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CONDITIONAL SHARE SUBSCRIPTIONS
An orthodox method of legal research by one who undertakes
to investigate a legal problem has been the study of a mass of
cases, which are believed to contain related data, in an attempt
to reveal the legal principles upon which the courts were relying
in deciding such cases. Others, dubious as to the pre-existence
of a system of legal principles by which courts purporting to
follow "the common law" are controlled, are accustomed to ex-
amine such related fact situations in an effort to ascertain their
legal consequences as decreed by the courts, and thus to develop
or induce a generalization (or principle) with respect to typical
fact situations which will constitute a reasonably accurate pre-
diction of how future courts will react to such typical fact situa-
tions. In the following comment an attempt has been made to
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present such typical fact situations as recur in the field of "Con-
ditional Share Subscriptions" and the actual reactions of courts
thereto. It is believed that this will prove to be a more useful
and, in the end, a simpler presentation of the subject than could
be accomplished by talking in terms of pre-existent, inherently
self-explanatory general principles.
Conditional subscriptions for shares of the authorized capital
stock of corporations have provided a fruitful source of litiga-
tion. With policies possibly favoring one type of condition and
disfavoring another,' the differing parties who may bring 2 ac-
tions and against whom actions may be brought, and the wholly
distinct considerations involved in subscriptions for shares in
corporations to be formed and in corporations already in exist-
ence,3 it is almost inevitable that much confusion is to be found
in the cases.
I "Conditional subscriptions to the stock of corporations are unusual, and
often operate to defeat subscribers who become such absolutely and upon
the faith that all the stock is equally bound to contribute to the hazards
of the enterprise. It misleads creditors and is a fruitful source of liti-
gation and disaster. Tending to the ensnarement of creditors and con-
trary to a sound public policy, conditional subscriptions to corporate shares
ought not to be encouraged." Paducah & AT. Ry. Co. v. Parks, 8G Tenn. 554,
560, 8 S. W. 842, 844 (1888).
2 Entirely different rules may govern an action on a share subscription,
depending upon whether the action is instituted by the corporation itself
or by its receiver in insolvency. "Whatever may be the rule in regard to
giving notice as a preliminary step to making a call as between a corpora-
tion which is a going concern and a subscriber to its stock, it is clear that
after the company has failed and its assets have been placed in the hands
of a receiver who has been directed by the court to bring suit for the
purpose of collecting any amount due by any person, thus including un-
paid stock subscriptions, a petition in a suit so brought by the receiver
to recover the entire amount of unpaid subscriptions is not subject to
demurrer on the ground it does not allege that notice has been given to
the subscriber of the compliance by the corporation with the condition of
the subscription." Cox v. Hardee, 135 Ga. 80, 89, 68 S. E. 932, 930 (1910).
See also inf!ra, note 36.
3 The reasons for a policy of disfavoring conditional subscriptions in a
corporation to be formed would not necessarily apply where the corporation
was extant at the time the subscription was made. In Pennsylvania such
a distinction is recognized where quasi-public corporations are involved.
Conditions inserted in offers to subscribe for shares in corporations not
yet formed are there held to be invalid, and the subscription offer when
later accepted by the corporation is held to be unconditional and binding on
the subscriber. Where the corporation is extant, however, the conditions
are recognized as binding on both parties. Boyd v. Peach Bottom Ry., 90 Pa.
169 (1879). But in an early case in New York it was held that if the
conditions affect the routes of turnpikes or railroads, the subscription,
although it involved an extant corporation, was void and unenforceable by
the corporation. The court also suggested that such a conditional sub-
scription would be unenforceable against the corporation by the subscriber.
The Troy & Boston Ry. Co. v. Tibbits, 18 Barb. 297 (N. Y. 1854).
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Conditions recognized by the courts fall into two general di-
visions: express and implied. The express conditions are in turn
subdivided into conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. 4
A share subscription containing a condition precedent may be
described as a subscription whereby, in the absence of a waiver
or estoppel,- the subscriber does not become a shareholder, for
the purpose of allowing the corporation to recover the price of
the shares, until there has been performance or fulfillment of
the stipulated condition. In the case of a condition subsequent,
the subscriber does become a shareholder prior to the perform-
ance of the condition, but subsequent non-performance of the
condition gives him a right of action against the corporation for
its failure to perform the condition2
This comment will be concerned with an analysis of the legal
relations arising out of conditional subscription cases from the
standpoint of who is bringing the action and the type of condi-
tion involved. The cases considered have, for the most part,
been decided within the past twenty years and it is believed that
all the cases since about 1907 on the matters here discussed are
included in this paper.
I. CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS 7 FOR SHARES IN EXISTING COR-
PORATIONS.
A. Where the subscription contains an express condition that
it is not to be binding, i. e., the shares not to be paid foir,
unless other subscriptions for a designated number of
shares are obtained.
1. Where the action is instituted by the corporation against
the subscriber.
The case of Nowlin v. Memphis Corporation 8 involved this
familiar type of condition., In this case, two years after such a
4 Conditions subsequent in subscriptions are sometimes referred to as
subscriptions on special terms. 1 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927)
§ 712.
5 The courts do not seem to follow any definite "principle" of waiver or
estoppel. When, in certain circumstances the defendant is not permitted
to set up his condition as a defense, the courts label the fact situation as
"waiver" or "estoppel." What these situations are can only be determined
by an examination of the cases. See cases cited infra notes 11, 12, 31, 32.
6 See Bobzin v. Gould Balance Valve Co., 140 Iowa 744, 749, 118 N. W.
40, 42 (1908).
7 The word "subscription" is used in this division of the comment to refer
to a fact situation constituting a written contract between a corporation
and an individual (herein called the "subscriber") for the future creation
of shares of a specified class and number of such corporation in such per-
son, upon the fulfillment of stated conditions.
8 161 Ark. 294, 255 S. W. 1092 (1923).
9 The action was brought on a non-negotiable note. Seemingly it makes
no difference whether a corporation sues on a note or on a subscription con-
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subscription was made, the corporation brought an action on it
against the subscriber. Just prior to the action the corporation's
privilege to sell additional shares was revoked.10 It failed to
prove that the designated number of subscriptions was secured.
The corporation was not permitted to recover, the court labelling
the fact situation in this case a condition precedent.
The condition in a subscription that it is not to be binding un-
less other subscriptions for a designated number of shares are
obtained may be waived.". An acquiescence in corporation affairs
to the extent of signing for a crypt in the corporation's mauso-
leum was held not to be a waiver of the instant condition.12
Where the required number of shares had not been subscribed
for, purchase money already paid was recovered by the sub-
scriber." In this last case, had the corporation become insolvent
prior to the subscriber's action, the question of his status as
compared with that of general creditors would have been raised.
Jurisdictions strongly favoring creditors 1 might well defer the
subscriber's rights to those of creditors. Whether such a sub-
scriber would be given a preference over shareholders is debat-
able.
2. Where the action is instituted on behalf of corporate cred-
itors, i. e., by a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy against
the subscriber.
Illustrative of this situation is the case of Foote v. Grilick.'s
The subscription list in that case read as follows:
tract, except, possibly, in the matter of burden of proof of consideration.
The assignee of a corporation note with knowledge vwould seem to stand
in the corporation's shoes. Phillips v. Matthews, 205 Ala. 480, 88 So. 641
(1920).
"I The effect of the revocation of the corporation's privilege to sell shares
was not discussed.
1 Cf. Alexander v. North Carolina Say. Bank and Trust Co., 155 N. C.
124, 71 S. E. 69 (1911).
12 Stuart v. Mausoleum Co., 190 Misc. 906, 179 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1st. Dept.
1919); Alexander v. N. C. Bank, supra note 11.
" Stuart v. Mausoleum Co., supra note 12. This comment does not pur-
port to deal generally with the class of cases where the action is instituted
by the subscriber against the corporation.
-In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). This
case did not involve conditional subscriptions but it throws light on the
attitude of this court toward creditors. S owned -50,000 of the capital
stock of the X corporation. He sold his shares to the corporation and re-
ceived for them the corporation's note for S,50,000. The corporation was
solvent at this time and it was authorized by statute to purchase its own
shares. When the corporation later became insolvent, S's rights under the
note were postponed to those of other corporate creditors. If S had re-
ceived payment for his shares at the time he turned them over to the
corporation, the transaction undoubtedly would have been valid.
'5 166 Mich. 636, 132 N. W. 473 (1911) ; cf. Seubert v. Scott, considered
in text at note 20.
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Provided full $6,000 is taken
4 . D 5 0 " " " " "
5. E 25 " " 4 , 41 ,,
6. F 20 " " " " "
The par value of each share was $10. Action was brought
by the trustee against the defendant, A. From "the above list
it would seem to be clear that the subscriptions of A, B, and C
were absolute, whereas those of D, E, and F were conditional
on $6,000 being taken. The appellate court, however, remanded
the case that a jury might determine whether the former sub-
scriptions were conditional, and in so doing apparently was not
inclined to favor the trustee's cause.
B. Where the subscription contains an. express condition other
than the type mentioned in A.
1. Where the action is instituted by the corporation against
the subscriber.
No case decided in the present century has been found involv-
ing a state of facts where a corporation, not having performed
its condition nevertheless brought suit.10 Such an action might
be maintained on the theory that the corporation had a cause of
action against the subscriber although the subscriber would in
turn have a cause of action against it for failure to perform the
condition."
2. Where the action is instituted by or on behalf of a creditor
or creditors of the corporation, as by a receiver or the cor-
poration's trustee in bankruptcy, against the subscriber.
Where S subscribed for shares in the X corporation provided
he would be given a bonus in the form of common shares, it was
held, in a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy, that the subscrib-
er's duty to pay the agreed amount was not contingent upon his
being granted the bonus. 18 A subscription on condition that the
16 In the case of Farm Lands Development Co. v. Taft, 194 Iowa 481,
186 N. W. 431 (1922), the defendant, in addition to an absolute subscrip-
tion for 500 shares, subscribed for 187'/ shares upon condition that the
"subscription shall only be binding in case the directors of said Farm
Lands Development Co. decide that it is necessary to issue such additional
stock. .. ." The board of directors later found it necessary to increase the
number of shares and gave due notice. The corporation, the court decided,
had fully performed its condition by passing "the necessary resolutions to
sell additional stock and to amend the articles of incorporation and increase
the authorized capital stock."
17 See Bobzin v. Gould Balance Valve Co., supra note 6; 1 ThobPsoN, toc.
cit. supra note 4.
is Skillin v. Magnus, 162 Fed. 689 (D. N. Y. 1907). In Barber v. De-
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subscriber shall be elected president of the corporation and shall
be allowed to pay for his shares out of his salary was held not
to be effective against -the receiver "whatever the rights of the
corporation might have been." " Seubert v. Scott "- involved a
suit brought by a judgment creditor of a corporation on the al-
leged unpaid balance of the defendant's subscription. The de-
fense set up was the failure of the corporation to obtain a patent,
the defendant's subscription expressly stating that it was not to
be paid until the patent was procured. The court held the de-
fense good. These decisions indicate that where the interests of
corporate creditors are involved there is an apparent ten-
dency of the courts to contrue as conditions precedent those which
expressly stipulate against payment until the condition is per-
formed, whereas conditions making no express reference to
payment by the subscriber are more frequently construed as con-
ditions subsequent.
IL CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS 2' FOR SHARES IN CORPORA-
TIONS TO BE FORMED.
A. Where the subscriptiom contains an express condition that
it is not to be binding, i. e., the shares izot to be paid for,
vnless other subscriptions for a designated number are se-
cured.
1. Action by the corporation against the subscriber.
This condition is one of the commonest to be found in share
subscriptions. Its inclusion in the subscription agreement be-
comes of importance only in certain circumstances inasmuch as
there is a common law rule that, in the absence of evidence point-
ing to a contrary intention, no subscription for shares in a cor-
poration to be formed is enforceable by the corporation until
the entire amount of the authorized capital stock set out in the
subscription list, articles of association or certificate of incorpor-
ation has been subscribed.22 Such implied condition may be
Camp, 96 S. C. 432, 81 S. E. 155 (1914), S subscribed for a number of
shares in a corporation providing he could pay in perzonal services. It is
not clear from the case whether the condition was written or oral. The
receiver was allowed to recover in cash.
19 Spratling v. Westbrook, 140 Ga. 625, 79 S. E. 536 (1913).
2D 39 S. D. 278, 164 N. W. 75 (1917).
21 The word "subscription" is used in this division of the comment to
refer to the fact situation whereby an individual (herein called the sub-
scriber) executes a written document by the terms of which he agrees with
some other party to take a certain number of shares in a corporation later
to be formed.
22 "This is no arbitrary rule; it is founded on a plain dictate of justice,
and the strict principles regulating the obligation of contracts. When a
man subscribes a share to a stock corporation, to consist of one thousand
shares, in order to carry on some designated enterprise, he binds himself
to pay a thousandth part of the cost of such enterprise. If only five
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waived.23 This general rule has been construed to have been
changed by statute in several states,24 and in those states, as in
others later to be mentioned, the express incorporation of the
instant condition into share subscriptions becomes important.
The parties may, if they so desire, expressly or by implication
provide that the subscription is to be paid even though the full
amount of the authorized capital stock is not subscribed for.2
In the cases herein considered the parties either provided by
the terms of their subscriptions that subscriptions to the full
amount of the authorized capital stock were not required before
the corporation could do business, or the cases arose in the states
having statutes construed to be in derogation of the common law
rule, or in states not purporting to follow this common law rule.20
It has been decided that when a subscription contains an ex-
press condition that it is not to be binding unless other subscrip-
tions for a designated number of shares are secured, the sub-
scriber is under no duty to pay the subsequently formed corpor-
ation unless the condition has been complied with 27 and that the
condition is a condition precedent. Such a condition is not con-
sidered to have been fulfilled if the corporation knowingly ac-
cepts subscriptions which are necessary to make up the pre-
scribed amount of capital stock from individuals not having the
hundred are subscribed for and he can have no assurance which he is
bound to accept that the remainder will be taken, he would be held, if
liable to assessment, to pay a five-hundreth part of the cost of the enter-
prise, besides incurring the risk of an entire failure of the enterprise it-
self, and the loss of the amount advanced towards it." Stoneham Branch
Railroad Company v. Gould, 2 Gray 277, 278 (Mass. 1854). Accord: Holli-
day v. Persons, 158 Ga. 742, 124 S. E. 353 (1924) ; of. Flury v. Twin Cities
Dairy Co., 136 Wash. 462, 240 Pac. 900 (1925).
23 Appeal of Cornell, 114 Pa. 153, 6 Atl. 258 (1886). See cases collected
in 16 Ann. Cas. 1253 (1910) annotation.
24 Where the statute authorizes the organization of a corporation upon
the subscription of a certain percentage of the amount of the proposed
capital stock, the rule requiring that all the authorized capital shall be
subscribed for does not apply. Alabama-Schloss v. Montgomery Trade
Co., 87 Ala. 411, 6 So. 360 (1889); California-San Bernardino Invest.
Co. v. Merrill, 108 Cal. 490, 41 Pac. 487 (1895) ; Indiana-Fox v. Allens-
ville Turnpike Co., 46 Ind. 31 (1874); Kansas--Hunt v. Kansas Bridge
Co., 11 Kan. 412 (1873); Nebraska-Lincoln Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Sheldon,
44 Neb. 279, 62 N. W. 480 (1895); New York-Schenectady Plank Road
Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102 (1854); Ohio-Jewett v. Valley R. R., 34
Ohio St. 601 (1878); Oregon-Astoria Ry. v. Hill, 20 Or. 177, 25 Pac.
379 (1890); Wisconsin-Milwaukee Brick Co. v. Schoknecht, 108 Wis. 457,
84 N. W. 838 (1901).
25 Stone v. Monticello Construction Co., 135 Ky. 659, 117 S. W. 369 (1909).
26 Belton Compress Co. v. Saunders, 70 Tex. 699, 6 S. W. 134 (1887).
27 Stone v. Monticello Const. Co., supra note 25. In this case the author-
ized capital stock of the corporation was $100,000. By the terms of the
subscription the parties manifested an intention that it should be binding
when subscriptions had been secured to extent of $80,000.
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apparent ability to pay them.28 The corporation, if it secures a
subscription from an individual who is without means to pay it,
has no valid defense if it merely alleges that it did not know the
subscriber's financial state, provided it ought to have known it.20
It has been said that the ability of an individual to pay his
subscription is tested as of the time of the making of the sub-
scription.3 0
The above condition may be waived.31 Election to the office of
director in a corporation seemingly amounts to an automatic
waiver of the condition.32
This condition may be further restricted by providing that
only persons of a certain class shall be privileged to subscribe
for shares.33 In construing such a condition, liberality has been
shown in finding that the individual whose privilege to subscribe
has been questioned possessed the necessary qualifications.3'
2. Action by or on behalf of the creditors of the corporation
against the subscriber.
The case of Hollander v. Hea-slip 35 involved a suit by a receiver
of an insolvent corporation against an individual who subscribed
for five shares in the corporation. The subscription provided
that no call could be made for payment for the shares until two
hundred an fifty thousand dollars, or half the authorized capital
28 Stone v. Monticello Company, supra note 25.
29 Cf. ibid.
3o Heiskell v. Morris, 135 Tenn. 238, 186 S. W. 99 (1916). This rule does
not seem inclusive enough. The condition should be considered fulfilled if
the subscriber has the ability to pay at the time the controversy arises,
even though he may not have been able to pay when the subscription was
made.
31 McConnaghy v. Monticello Construction Co., 135 Ky. 667, 117 S. W. 372
(1909). In Panhandle Packing Co. v. Stringfellow, 180 S. W. 145 (Te.
Civ. App. 1915), a condition in the subscription stated that it was not to
be binding unless $150,000 was subscribed for and paid in before the cer-
tificate of incorporation was obtained. By taking steps to procure a certif-
icate, signing an affidavit therefor, and being elected second vice president
of the plaintiff corporation, the defendant's conduct was held to have
amounted to a waiver of the condition. Cf. Enterprise Sheet Metal Works
v. Schendel, 63 Mont. 529, 208 Pac. 933 (1922).
32 McConnaghy v. Monticello Co., szipra note 31.
33 Poultry Producers of Southern California v. Nilsson, 197 Cal. 245,
239 Pac. 1086 (1925).
34 Ibid. The subscription stated that shares were to be purchased by per-
sons owning poultry "at the rate of one share for every thousand hens or
majarity (italics ours) fraction;-the minimum subscription ... being one
share." It was held that persons owning less than 500 hens were eligible
subscribers for one share.
35 222 Fed. 808 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915). In this case the directors falzely
represented that subscriptions for the required amount had been secured
and the subscribers had paid a call. The court attached no importance to
the payment of the call in such circumstances.
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stock, had been subscribed. The subsequent insolvency of the
corporation was due partly to the failure to secure the amount
of capital stock required by the subscription. The court held
that the trustee could not recover from the defendant on his sub-
scription because the condition therein contained was never ful-
filled. The court, however, took pains to point out, first, that
there was no averment in the pleadings that creditors relied on
the defendant's subscription in extending credit to the corpora-
tion, and secondly, that it was possible that the creditors had
knowledge of the terms upon which the subscription was made.
The inference may be drawn from this case that if the trustee
had shown the court a plausible reason why the subscriber should
not have been allowed to take advantage of his condition, the
trustee might have been permitted to prevail for the benefit of
creditors. Indeed, in some jurisdictions following the "implied
condition" rule (i. e., the common law rule that all of the capital
stock of a corporation must be subscribed for before the sub-
scriptions become binding on the subscribers), non-fulfillment
of this implied condition is no defense as against creditors; 11
other courts seem quick to find a waiver of the condition on the
part of the subscriber.3 It would seem fair to assume that the
tendency to favor creditors will be the same whether the problem
arises in a jurisdiction following the "implied condition" rule
or in a jurisdiction following what may be called the "express
condition" rule.38
B. Conditions relating to internal affairs of the corporation
which do not expressly state that the subscription is not to
be binding unless they are fulfilled.-Action by the corpora-
tion against the subscriber.
36 "It is urged on behalf of some of the defendants, as a ground of de-
fense, that all the stock of the Conewango and Clarion Railroad Company
was not subscribed for. I think this would be a complete defense in an
action by the corporation to recover unpaid subscriptions to its capital
stock. But it does not follow that a defense, good between the subscriber
to its capital stock and the corporation, is good in a suit between such
subscriber and a creditor of the corporation." Hamilton v. Clarion, M. &
P. R. R., 144 Pa. 34, 46, 23 Alt. 53, 54 (1891).
37 Appeal of Cornell, supra note 23.
38 This exact result has been reached in a state which by statute had
provided that the entire amount of the authorized capital should be sub-
scribed before a corporation could do business. The court in Flury v.
Twin Cities Dairy Co., supra note 22, said at 464, 240 Pac. 900: "The de-
fense was that a part of the capital stock had been subscribed by a corpora-
tion, which, under the law, was not competent to make such a subscrip-
tion. The court, while recognizing this as an applicable rule had the suit
been by the corporation while a solvent going concern, held that it was not
such in a suit by a receiver of an insolvent corporation to recover for the
benefit of creditors."
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In Drake Hotel Co. v. CraneIB a condition was inserted in the
defendant's subscription that the hotel was to cost a certain
amount.40  The condition was not fulfilled. A statute existed
which required 50 per cent of the authorized capital stock
to be paid in before a certificate of incorporation could be
obtained. It was held under such circumstances that the condi-
tion was ineffective and that the subscription must be treated as
absolute. Where such a statute exists it is said that conditions are
without effect as "every consideration of public policy ... requir-
ing at least 50 per cent of the stock to be paid for before a cer-
tificate of incorporation shall issue will apply with equal force
to prevent the dissipation of the funds of the corporation. .. "
Under this statute, apparently even if the subscription had ex-
pressly provided that the subscriber was to be under no duty to
pay unless the condition were complied with, such subscription
would, even though the condition was not fulfilled, nevertheless
have been enforceable by the corporation. Language in the
opinion would indicate that the court would not have enforced
such a condition even though the statutory requirement had
been met. Under circumstances similar to those in the Drake
Hotel case a subscriber was held even though no statute was
involved. 41 The absence of the statute in the latter case would
allow the subscriber to maintain an action against the cor-
poration for breach of contract, whereas in the first case, in
all probability, no such counter action would be available. In
Warren County Co-operative Association Co. v. Boyd 42 the sub-
scriber stipulated that a certain marketing plan was to be
adopted by the corporation. The condition was never performed
but, nevertheless, the subscriber was held to be under a duty to
pay the corporation.
C. Situations wherein the subscriber attempts to protect him-
self against possible loss of his inveztment by express con-
ditions in the subscription.-Action by the corporation.
S, a subscriber for shares in the proposed X corporation, had
a condition written into his subscription that if the "hotel is
leased, the lessee be bound for as long a time as to retire any
39 210 Mo. App. 452, 240 S. W. 859 (1922).
40 Condition that the hotel cost $150,000. Held, the subscriber must pay
although the hotel cost $200,000.
41 Felker v. Monroe Hotel Co., 34 Ga. App. 56, 128 S. E. 212 (1925). The
hotel in this case was to cost "not less than $100,000." How much the
hotel actually did cost does not appear.
42171 N. C. 184, 88 S. E. 153 (1916). The "finding" of a compliance with
conditions is another example of the undesirable practice to which the
courts resort in order to achieve what they conceive to be a desirable result.
See also Snodgrass v. Zander, infra note 46, where a condition that the
assets of a corporation total a certain amount was apparently ignored.
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bonds that are issued." The hotel was leased but apparently
the above provision was not put in the lease. The subscriber was
held to be privileged not to pay the corporation on the ground of
non-fulfillment of the condition.43 Although other cases involv-
ing this type of condition were actually decided on other grounds,
it would seem that the courts are willing to let the subscriber off
whenever possible " and, according to one case, it is not neces-
sary that the condition be known to the other subscribers 41 to
allow this result.
D. Miscellaneous situations.-Action by the corporation.
Where a firm organized in one state was induced to move into
another state and incorporate there, a condition in the subscrip-
tions for shares in the proposed corporation that the assets were
to "invoice not less than $6,000 at a reasonable cash value" and
that the pay roll of the factory was to be $2,000 a month was,
in effect, held to have been complied with although the evidence
tended to prove that the assets were not worth over $2,500.4
There seems to be a tendency on the part of the courts to find
performance of conditions in subscriptions to so-called co-opera-
tive ventures or to treat them as conditions subsequent. 4T
CONCLUSIONS
I. CORPORATION ALREADY IN EXISTENCE.
A. Condition providing that the subscription is not to be bind-
ing unless a specified number of shares are subscribed.
This type of condition will be construed most strongly against
the corporation and a waiver will not be readily found. When
the corporation is insolvent its creditors seem to stand in no bet-
ter position than the corporation.
B. Miscellaneous conditions not expressly providing that the
subscription is not to be binding unless the condition is
complied with.
The courts tend to hold the subscriber under a duty to pay
43 New Neuces Hotel Co. v. Weil, 243 S. W. 731 (Tex. Civ. App, 1922);
of. Kingston v. Nichols, 221 Mich. 677, 192 N. W. 768 (1923).
4 Merchants Supply Co. v. Hughes' Ex'rs, 139 Va. 212, 123 S. E. 355
(1924) (condition that competent man be taken into the corporation) ; Sher-
rod v. Duffy, 160 Mich. 488, 125 N. W. 366 (1910) (condition that cream-
ery be satisfactory); Canyon Creek Elevator & Milling Co. v. Allison, 53
Mont. 604, 165 Pac. 753 (1917) (condition that committee approve of the
enterprise).
45 New Neuces Hotel Co. v. Well, supra note 43.
46 Snodgrass v. Zander & Co., 106 Ark. 462, 154 S. W. 212 (1913). See
also the case of Natwick v. Terwilliger, 24 Wyo. 253, 160 Pac. 338 (1916).
47 Poultry Producers of Southern California v. Nilsson, supra note 33;
Warren Cooperative Ass'n v. Boyd, considered in text at note 42; of. Na-
tional Bank of the Republic v. Beckstead, 250 Pac. 1033 (Utah, 1926).
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the creditors of an insolvent corporation, but query where the
subscriber has expressly stipulated that the subscription is not to
be binding unless the condition is fulfilled.
II. CORPORATIONS TO BE FORMED.
A. Condition providing that the subscription is not to be bind-
ing unless a specified %umber of shares are subscribed.
A compliance with or waiver of this condition is likely to be
found, especially in favor of the trustee in insolvency.
B. Condition relating to method of operating the entcrprise.
The subscriber is likely to be held on this type of condition.
C. Conditions by virtue of which the subscriber attcmpts to
protect himself against the loss of his investment.
In the absence of full performance by the corporation, the sub-
scriber is not likely to be held under a duty to pay his subscrip-
tion.
D. Miscellaneous conditions.
No general conclusion is attempted as to these cases.
W. B. F.
QUO WARRANTO AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
In a recent Pennsylvania case," the Attorney General ex officio
brought quo warranto proceedings against the defendant corpor-
ation for violating an act 2 prohibiting the performance of
worldly employment on Sunday. The defendant answered that
quo warranto would not lie, and that the sole penalty was a fine
of four dollars provided in the act. The demurrer of the state
was sustained below, however, and a decree was rendered re-
straining the defendant from playing professional baseball on
Sunday. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed, %ith two judges
dissenting.
Can quo warranto be used to enforce a criminal law against
a private corporation? Is a corporation liable thus to be en-
joined from purporting to exercise corporate functions, or from
engaging in some particular corporate activity, whenever it is
guilty of some criminal act? BIust the court issue such a re-
straining order whenever criminal conduct of a corporation is
attacked by quo warranto proceedings? Some discussion of the
history and nature of quo warranto proceedings would seem a
prerequisite to an attempt to offer a satisfactor solution to such
problems.
The writ of quo warranto 3 first came into prominence in early
I Com. v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 138 AtL. 497 (Pa.
1927).
2 Pa. Stat. (West, 1921) § 20252.
3 "A writ of quo warranto is in the nature of a writ of right for the
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medieval times, when it was so succesful a weapon in the hands
of Norman Kings for curbing the power of the strong feudal
barons. It was inevitable that the action of the king, in requir-
ing all claimants of royal privileges to abandon their claims or
substantiate them with documentary evidence, should create dis-
content, but it was not to be denied that such action was proper
on the theory of the king's lawyers that every franchise 4 pre-
sumed a grant from the crown.5 Indeed, this use of quo war-
ranto became firmly established, and the writ was soon extended
to forfeit franchises for abuse and non-use as well., It is clear
also that quo warranto was originally intended solely as a royal
weapon, but later it seems that a private individual could make
use of the writ by informing the proper royal officials.'
As early as the sixteenth century, however, the old common
law action, cumbersome as were all the real actions, began to
give way to the more simple procedure of the information in the
nature of quo warranto,8 and two centuries later the writ of
quo warranto had become practically obsolete." A statute, regu-
lating the procedure of the already existing remedy, recognized
that the information might be filed on the relation of a private
individual.10 The information of quo warranto, moreover, be-
came identical in scope with the older remedy,1' and the two
King against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty,
to inquire by what authority he supports his claim." 3 BL. COAIAI. * 262;
7 ComYN, DIGEST (1822) 192.
4 "For franchises are special privileges conferred by government upon
individuals, which do not belong to the citizens of a country, generally, of
common right. It is essential to the character of a franchise that it should
be a grant from the sovereign authority, and in this country, no franchise
can be held which is not derived from a law of the state." Taney, C. J., in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 595 (U. S. 1839); cf. State v.
Bank, 5 Ark. 595 (1844).
G For the early history of quo warranto, see 1 HOLDSWORTUI, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1922) 88 et seq.; 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY O'
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 572 et seq.; 2 REEVES, HISTORY OF ENGLISHI
LAW (1869) 126-9.
6 Rex v. Hertford Corp., 1 Salk. 374 (1699) ; Rex v. Bridge, 1 Win. Bl.
46 (1749) ; see Peter v. Kendal, 6 B. & C. 703, 710 (1827) ; BLACKSTONE, loe.
cit. supra note 3; 1 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 89.
7 See Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 527; cf. 9 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 236. But see
Rice v. National Bank, 126 Mass. 300, 303 (1879); HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REMEDIES (3d ed. 1896) 554.
8 See Darley v. Reg., 12 Cl. & Fin. 520, 537 (1845) ; 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 230; 9 ibid. 237.
9 Quo Warranto Informations (1915) 59 SOL. L. J. 595; 3 BLACKSTONE,
Zoo. cit. supra note 3.
10 (1710) 9 Anne, c. 20.
2 Rex v. Sheperd, 4 Term. R. 381 (1791); Com. v. Murray, 11 Serg. &
R. 73 (Pa. 1874) ; Lindsey v. Attorney General, 33 Miss. 508, 523 (1857).
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have for all practical purposes become indistinguishable. 2 For,
although there was a distinction originally, in that the writ was
a civil action 13 while the information began as a criminal prose-
cution in which the defendant if guilty was ousted and fined,'
4
nevertheless the fine soon became nominal, and the information
in all but form was a civil action.'5
Since private corporations are, at least in theory, created by
the state, they are subject to attack by quo warranto proceed-
ings under the proper circumstances. 0 Indeed, in the absence
of statute, quo warranto is the exclusive means of restraining
individuals from purporting to be a corporation, or restraining
a corporation from engaging in some unauthorized activity.17
But quo warranto has always been considered an extraordinary
12 State v. West Wis. Ry., 34 Wis. 197 (1874); State v. Gleason, 12 Fla.
190, 208 (1868). Contra: State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 279 (1829).
13 See Rex v. Marsden, 3 Burr, 1812, 1817 (1765).
14 State v. Ashley, supra note 12; 3 BLACKSTONE, toe. cit. saupra note 3.
15 Ames v. State of Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 4 Sup. Ct. 437 (1884); Attor-
ney General v. Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446, 40 N. E. 843 (1895); Klein v.
Wilson, 7 F. (2d) 772 (D. N. J. 1925); Standard Oil Co. v. State of
Missouri, 224 U. S. 270, 32 Sup. Ct. 406 (1912) (quo warranto proceed-
ings declared civil, but fine upheld as representing either damages for
breach of the contract with the state, or a proper civil penalty); Note
(1912) 12 CoL. L. REv. 548; BLACKSTONE, loc. cit. supra note 3. Contra:
Donelly v. People, 11 Ill. 552 (1850). The information in the nature of
quo warranto has been declared civil in England by (1884) 47 & 48 Vict. c.
61, § 15. In many of our states there are statutes providing that quo
warranto proceedings may be brought as ordinary civil actions. People
v. Buffalo Cement Co., 131 N. Y. 140, 29 N. E. 947 (IS92); State v. Des
Moines Ry. Co., 135 Iowa 694, 109 N. W. 867 (1906) ; State v. Portage City
Water Co., 107 Wis. 441, 83 N. W. 697 (1900).
16 The remainder of this comment will be limited to a consideration of
the use of quo warranto against private corporations.
1TKosman v. Thomson, 211 N. W. 878 (Iowa, 1927); Andel v. Duquesne
Ry., 219 Pa. 635, 69 AtL. 278 (1908); Clark v. Interstate Tel. Co., 72
Neb. 883, 101 N. W. 977 (1904); Stockton v. American Tobacco Co., 55
N. J. Eq. 352, 36 Atl. 971 (1897); Ann. Cas. 1916B 179, annotation. It
should be noted, perhaps, that where a corporation's acts create a public
nuisance, a bill in equity may be allowed to enjoin their continuance, without
regard to the defendant's corporate capacity or whether such acts are
authorized. Also, that toward the end of the eighteenth century quo war-
ranto proceedings against private corporations were limited in England
to cases of usurpation; to enforce a forfeiture for abuse of a franchise
by a duly organized corporation it was necessary to proceed by -cire
facias. 9 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 66; 2 KENT, CoSML * 013.
In this country there were a few early cases where the writ of scire faciao
was used to forfeit a franchise of a corporation for abuse. State v. Moore,
19 Ala. 514 (1851); State v. Scott, 32 Tenn. 332 (1852); State v. Con-
solidated Co., 46 Md. 1 (1876) (statute); Green v. St. Albans Trust Co.,
57 Vt. 340 (1885) (statute). Unless under statute, however, there have
been no recent cases in this country where a writ of scirc facias was used,
or in which it was intimated that quo warranto was not the proper remedy
for such a purpose.
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remedy, and hence there are said to be important limitations
on its use. Thus, where the relator is a private individual, the
writ or information issues only in the discretion of the court."8
And, in several jurisdictions, quo warranto proceedings against
a private corporation may be brought only by the attorney gen-
eral ex officio.1 9 Furthermore, if the relator is not an "inter-
ested" party,20 if the injury is of a "private" nature,21 and gen-
erally if there is another "adequate" remedy,22 quo warranto
will not be permitted. It is obvious, however, that such terms
as "'interested," "private," and "adequate" have no inherent
meaning, no significance other than what they have received by
judicial interpretation, with the result that these apparent limi-
Is State v. Cupples Power Co., 283 Mo. 115, 223 S. W. 75 (1920); Ohio
Turnpike Co. v. Waechter, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 605 (1903); Attorney General
v. Erie R. R., 55 Mich. 15, 20 N. W. 696 (1884); People v. Gas Light Coke
Co., 205 Ill. 482, 68 N. E. 950 (1903); Stat6 v. Endowment Trust Co., 140
Ala. 610, 37 So. 442 (1904).
19 Rex v. Corp. of Carmarthen, 2 Burr. 869 (1759); Rex. v. Ogden, 10
B. & C. 230 (1829); Sherwood v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 193 Iowa 365,
185 N. W. 279 (1921) ; Attorney General v. Adonai Shomo Corp., 167 Mass.
424, 45 N. E. 762 (1897) ; Thirteenth St. Ry. v. Broad St. Rapid Transit Co.,
210 Pa. 10, 67 Atl. 901 (1907).
20 State v. Union Hebrew Congregation, 309 Mo. 587, 274 S. W. 413
(1925) (action dismissed where relator's only interest was as a citizen
of the state) ; State v. Point Roberts Co., 42 Wash. 409, 85 Pac. 22 (1906)
(action dismissed where relators were fishermen claiming to be injured by
defendant corporation's occupying more fisheries than authorized); Corm.
v. Allegheny Bridge Co., 20 Pa. 185 (1852).
23People v. Hillsdale & Chatham Turnpike Co., 2 Johns. 190 (N. Y.
1807), (quo warranto not proper when defendant failed to make compensa-
tion for land taken by eminent domain); People v. North Chicago Ry.,
88 Ill. 537 (1878) (quo warranto not proper to test authority to extend
railway and introduce steam engines, where relator is abutting landowner) ;
State v. Atchinson Ry., 176 Mo. 687, 75 S. W. 776 (1903) (private injury
where shipper paid illegal reconsignment charges); People v. Mutual
Gas Light Co., 38 Mich. 154 (1878) (private injury where defendant laid
pipe lines over relators' land).
22 Gardner Trust Co. v. White Lead Corp., 157 N. E. 519 (Mass. 1927);
People v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 App. Div. 626, 115 N. Y. Supp, 393
(1st Dept. 1909); People v. Mutual Gas Light Co., supra note 21; State v.
Atlanta Ins. Co., 200 Ala. 443, 76 So. 375 (1917) (quo warranto dismissed
because act granting franchise provided remedy). But of. Eutaw Power
Co. v. Town of Eutaw, 202 Ala. 143, 79 So. 609 (1918) (remedy provided in
act granting franchise not a bar to quo warranto). Some states hold that
where a statute provides another remedy the effect is merely cumulative,
and the use of quo warranto is not limited. Attorney General v. Booth,
143 Mich. 89, 106 N. W. 868 (1906); State v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 142
Mo. 325, 41 S. W. 916 (1897). The frequency of statutes providing equit-
able remedies for shareholders and creditors, the parties most likely to
be interested in the conduct of a corporation, probably explain the com-
parative scarcity of quo warranto cases against private corporations,
particularly in recent years.
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tations leave a court with considerable room for the exercise
of its discretion in a doubtful case, even after the writ or in-
formation has issued.
As applied to corporations, the most characteristic use of quo
warranto is against individuals assuming the functions of a
corporation without having complied with the statutory prere-
quisites to incorporation.23 Similarly, it may be used where
individuals have made fraudulent representations that they were
qualified to be incorporated under certain statutes; 24 or to test
the constitutionality of an act under which individuals purport
to be incorporated or under which a corporation purports to
have been granted a franchise.25  The judgment in such cases,
if for the state, is one restraining the defendants from purport-
ing to be duly incorporated or from acting under the franchise
in question, and the discretion of the court would seem fairly
limited. But the large majority of cases in which quo warranto
proceedings are instituted involve so-called "ultra vires" or "ille-
gal" acts of duly organized corporations. Here the general rule,
glibly stated, that "a corporation may be ousted for abuse or
non-use of its franchise" 2G is of little practical value. For
there is firmly imbedded in the decisions of the courts the prem-
ise that quo warranto is too extraordinary and drastic a measure
to be sustained for an occasional, accidental, or trivial viola-
tion.27 In such cases, it would seeni that the discretion of the
court may be exercised, fast in deciding whether particular
23Green v. People, 150 Ill. 513, 37 N. E. 842 (1894) ; Smith v. State, 140
Ind. 343, 39 N. E. 1060 (1895); Attorney General v. Gay, 102 Mich. 612,
127 N. W. 814 (1910). In this country comparatively few cases seem to
have arisen against individuals for illegally attempting to assume the
position of a corporation, because of the ease with which individuals may
be incorporated usually under general statutes or in some cases by special
act. The usual procedure in cases where the existence of the corporation
is questioned is to name as parties defendant the individuals purporting
to be incorporated. See Ann. Cas. 1913A 570, annotation.
24 People v. Larsen, 265 Ill. 406, 106 N. E. 947 (1914) ; State v. Senato-
bia Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 76 So. 253 (1917); Floyd v. State, 177
Ala. 169, 59 So. 280 (1912).
25 People v. Cal. Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (192G);
People v. Gas Light Coke Co., supra note 18; Attorney General v. Perkins,
73 Mich. 303, 41 N. W. 426 (1889).
2c See, Reed v. Canal Corp., 65 Me. 132 (1S76).
27 Com. v. Potter Water Co., 212 Pa. 463, 01 Atl. 1099 (1905); State
v. Higby Co., 130 Iowa 69, 106 N. W. 382 (1906). "But we think that it
may be safely stated as to the general consensus of the authorities that
to constitute a misuse of the corporate franchise, such as to warrant its
forfeiture, the ultra-vires acts must be so substantial and continued as to
amount to a clear violation of the condition upon which the franchise was
granted, and so derange and destroy the business of the corporation that
it no longer fulfills the ends for which it was created." State v. Minn.
Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 226, 41 N. W. 1020, 1025 (1889).
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acts are "ultra-vires" or only incidental to the powers granted
by the articles of association or a relevant statute; -1 second,
having decided that particular acts are "ultra-vires" or "illegal,"
in determining whether the proceedings shall be maintained,
and, finally, in determining the penalty to be imposed.
2
1
In cases where a corporation does acts, which, if done by in-
dividual persons would be unobjectionable, but which are be-
yond the scope of its corporate powers, whether the court will
restrain the further peLformance of such acts, or leave the
corporation unmolested depends on the importance which such
infractions assume in the eyes of the court.3 ' Where a corpora-
tion violates a statute or its articles of association, or fails to
exercise an exclusive franchise, the main considerations are the
extent and seriousness of the violation, and the effect that the
judgment may have on the public welfare.3 1 Such considerations
28 First Nat. Bank v. State of Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 44 Sup. Ct. 213
(1924) (restraining federal bank from establishing branch bank within
state, as not being authorized by the national banking act, and thus violat-
ing a state statute).
29 State v. International Harvester Co., 237 Mo. 369, 141 S. W. 672
(1911); Voorhees v. Walker, 227 Mich. 291, 198 N. W. 994 (1924); State
v. Railway & Light Co., 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. 603 (1902); State v. Portland
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E. 1089 (1899).
30 State v. Des Moines City.Ry., supra note 15 (ouster from further
exercise of expired trolley franchise) ; State v. Milwaukee R. R., 116 Wis.
142, 92 N. W. 546 (1902); Com. v. Northeastern Ry., 161 Pa. 409, 29 AtI.
112 (1894) (restraining railroad from operating street car lines) ; Ohio v.
Ry., 53 Ohio 189, 41 N. E. 205 (1895) (ouster from control of canal lands
held not to be included in grant of railroad franchise) ; State v. Columbus
Electric Co., 104 Ohio 120, 135 N. E. 297 (1922) (enjoined from keeping
tracks on part of street other than that provided in act granting fran-
chise); People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358 (N. Y. 1818) (restraining
insurance company from engaging in banking business); Harris v. Miss.
R. R., 51 Miss. 602 (1875) (slight deviation from charter route over-
looked); State v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co., supra note 27 (occasionally
entering into "ultra-vires" contracts not grounds for interference) ; People
v. Lake St. R. R., 54 Ill. App. 348 (1894) (ouster denied where railroad
expended money in good faith, thinking it had authority to build).
31 State v. Public Drug Co., 41 S. D. 287, 170 N. W. 161 (1918) (dissolu-
tion for failure to file annual reports) ; People v. Buffalo Stone & Cement
Co., supra note 15 (dissolution for failure to have capital stock paid in) ;
Com. v. Potter Water Co., supra note 27 (corporation dissolved for contin-
ued practice of furnishing impure water); People v. Bank of Hudson, 6
Cow. 217 (N. Y. 1826) (continued insolvency of bank and assignment of
property to trustees for creditors warrants dissolution) ; State v. Milwau-
kee Ry., 45 Wis. 579 (1878) (keeping company's books and principal place
of business outside the state grounds for dissolution) ; People v. Toledo R.
R., 280 Ill. 495, 117 N. E. 701 (1917) (ouster from particular franchise
for failure to complete line within statutory period); State v. Madison
City Ry., 72 Wis. 612, 40 N. W. 487 (1888) (failure to keep road in condi-
tion required by charter justifies ouster from trolley franchise); State v.
Birmingham Waterworks Co., 185 Ala. 388, 64 So. 23 (1913) (failure to
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also indicate why a judgment dissolving the corporation is so
frequent in cases where a corporation enters into an agreement
or combination in restraint of trade. 2  Furthermore, where
there appears to be an attempt to work a fraud on the public,
or where a corporation's articles of association are used as a
cloak to aid in the perpetration of crime, the courts are aroused
to the proper state of indignation, and do not hesitate to inflict
the extreme penalty.2 3 Finally, where the prohibited acts vio-
discharge duties would forfeit franchise); State v. Pipher, 28 Kan. 127
(1882) (ouster from franchise for failure to use for nineteen years);
State v. Cincinnati R. R., 47 Ohio 130, 23 N. E. 928 (1890) (railroad
restrained from discriminating in rates); State v. Merchants Exchange,
269 Mo. 346, 190 S. W. 903 (1916) (restrained from weighing publicly
-without being bonded as required by statute); State v. Railway & Light
Co., supra note 29 (railroad enjoined from making charges above the legal
rates) ; State v. Insurance Co., 49 Ohio 440, 31 N. E. 658 (1892) (foreign
insurance corporation excluded from doing business within state for fail-
ure to have local organization required by statute); State v. Higby Co.,
supra note 27 (court refused to enjoin corporation from acting as trustee
of express trust, even if illegal, on grounds of lack of importance) ; Voor-
heis v. Walker, supra note 29 (failure to file tax reports on time and to
send in names of stockholders as required by statute not sufficient grounds
for forfeiture); State v. Atchison Ry., supra note 21 (illegal reconsignment
charges by railroad not of sufficient public importance to warrant interfer-
ence) ; People v. Atlantic Ave. Ry., 125 N. Y. 513, 26 N. E. 622 (1891)
(failure to run trains for five days and requiring more than statutory
number of hours of labor from employees not grounds for ouster); State
v. Baron, 58 N. H. 370 (1878) (failure to make returns required by stat-
ute did not merit dissolution); see People v. Kankakee River Co., 103 Ill.
491, 499 (1882) (ouster refused for failure to file papers, where the ob-
ject of the statute requiring it had ceased).
.2 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E.
834 (1890); State v. Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co., 44 N. D. 376, 176 N. W.
103 (1919); State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28, 84 N. W. 413 (1900);
State v. People's Ice & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168, 151 S. W. 101 (1912);
Attorney General v. Booth, supra note 22; People v. Live Stock Exchange,
170 Ill. 556, 48 N. E. 1062 (1897); State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 S. D.
136, 123 N. W. 504 (1909); State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio 1V7, 00 N.
E. 279 (1892); State v. Portland Natural Gas Co., supra note 29 (injunc-
tion against particular acts of restraint) ; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.,
130 Ill. 268, 22 N. E. 798 (1889) (defendant's demurrer overruled on
ground that it could be prevented from carrying out one of the objects
for which it was formed if tending toward monopoly); State v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., supra note 29 (court felt required to pronounce judg-
ment of ouster, but stayed execution of judgment which it felt would in-
jure public).
33 State v. St. Louis College of Physicians, 295 S. W. 537 (Mo. 1927);
State v. American University of Sanipractic, 140 Wash. 625, 250 Pac. 52
(1926) ; (dissolution of college for granting degrees to unqualified stu-
dents); State v. Business Men's Athletic Club, 178 Mo. App. 548, 163 S. W.
901 (1914) (dissolution of fraternal organization held to have used charter
to evade law against holding prize fights); State v. Springfield African
Social Club, 169 Mo. App. 137, 154 S. W. 458 (1913) (dissolution of fra-
ternal organization conducting a gambling house); State v. Interstate
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late a criminal statute for which ordinarily there would be
another adequate remedy, the courts will still sustain quo war-
ranto proceedings if they believe that the proper exigency ex-
ists and that the other remedy is not a sufficient deterrentA' It
is submitted, therefore, that the result of particular quo war-
ranto proceedings against a private corporation for alleged
"ultra-vires" or "illegal" acts rests largely within the discretion
of the court, and so should be consistent with the emotional
pattern of the community.
In the recent Pennsylvania case, the contention of the dissent-
ing opinions that quo warranto is never the proper remedy to
enforce a criminal law against a corporation where there is
another remedy provided by statute, is not persuasive, since the
fine provided is obviously not a sufficient deterrent to the de-
fendant corporation23 Nor is there any force in the analogy
to the doctrine that equity will not enjoin a crime. On the con-
trary, both historically and analytically, quo warranto proceed-
ings against private corporations would seem to be quasi-crim-
inal proceedings to vindicate the state's control over one pur-
porting to act under its authority. Moreover, it should be borne
in mind that, consistently with the theory advanced above, acts
may justify interference on the part of the state by injunction
to prohibit the repetition of certain violations, which would not
seem sufficient ground for dissolving a corporation." Finally,
it does not follow, as urged by the dissent, that with this case as
Savings Investment Co., 64 Ohio 283, 60 N. E. 220 (1901) (dissolution of
corporation issuing bonds under a scheme of chance); State v. Anthony
Fair Ass'n, 89 Kan. 238, 131 Pac. 626 (1913) (dissolution of corporation
organized to promote agricultural interests, which ran a race track where
gambling was permitted); People v. Michigan Sanitarium, 151 Mich. 452,
115 N. W. 423 (1908) (dissolution of charitable hospital for carrying on
business for profit); People v. Union Elevated Ry., 269 Il1. 212, 110 N. E.
1 (1915) (dissolution of corporation for fraudulent scheme for making
a dishonest and fictitious increase of capital stock) ; State v. Citizens Light
& Power Co., 172 Ala. 232, 55 So. 193 (1911) (dissolution of corporation
organized as dummy to place stock of another corporation on market at
fictitious increase in value).
3 State v. Capital City Dairy Co., 62 Ohio 350, 57 N. E. 62 (1900), afl'd
183 U. S. 238, 22 Sup. Ct. 120 (1902) (dissolution where fine was provided
for violation of statute regulating manufacture and sale of oleomargar-
ine) ; State v. Gamble-Robinson Co., supra note 32; State v. Central Lumber
Co., supra note 32 (dissolution for entering into agreements in restraint of
trade,, though 'statute provided criminal penalty); State v. French Lick
Springs Hotel Co., 42 Ind. App. 282, 82 N. E. 801 (1907); State v. Jockey
Club, 114 Ohio 582, 151 N. E. 709 (1926); State v. Delmar Jockey Club,
200 Mo. 34, 92 S. W. 185 (1905) (violation of anti-gambling laws ground
for quo" warranto).
3 See cases cited supra note 34.
36 See Cannon City Club v. People, 21 Colo. App. 37, 50, 121 Pac. 120,
124 (1912) ; also cases cited supra note 29.
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a precedent the state must in all fairness proceed by quo war-
ranto against all other corporations, such as telegraph, telephone,
newspaper, and trolley companies, which operate on Sunday.
A court in the face of such a contention might well hold such
industries necessities within the terms of the statute.
The objection, therefore, that quo warranto cannot be prop-
erly used to prevent corporations from committing criminal
acts does not seem valid. But neither can it be maintained that
a court is required to sustain quo warranto proceedings when-
ever a corporation is accused of criminal conduct. It would
seem, rather, that such a result would be desirable only under
circumstances where the offense is serious, and the existing
penalty not a sufficient deterrent. It is doubtful whether other
jurisdictions would consider playing professional baseball on
Sunday in violation of a blue law enacted in 1794 so objection-
able as to warrant proceedings in quo warranto.
ADMISSIBILITY OF BOOK ENTRIES IN NEW YORK
Historically, there are two rules by which account books may
be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule in New York.
The "Shopbook" rule,1 that the account books of a merchant or
tradesman 2 who keeps no clerk are admissible when it is proved
that they are his books, that his books are honestly kept, and that
some of the items charged are correct, had its origin in the
custom in the Dutch colony to admit such evidence in their ar-
bitration courts.3 This usage was strengthened by the "neces-
sity" of relieving the difficulties of proof of the accounts of the
small shopkeeper without a clerk and without the privilege of
testifying in his own behalf.4 The "business entries" rule came
from the English exception to the hearsay rule,s whereby en-
tries made in the regular course of business were admissible,
when the entrant was dead. Such entries were admissible as a
'Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns. 461 (N. Y. 1815); Swan v. Warner,
197 N. Y. 190, 90 N. E. 430 (1910) ; cf. Shmargon v. Rosenstein, 192 App.
Div. 143, 182 N. Y. Supp. 343 (3d Dept. 1920).
2The rule was later extended to include others than merchants and
tradesmen. Foster v. Coleman, 1 E. D. Smith 85 (N. Y. 1850) (doctor);
Rexford v. Comstock, 3 N. Y. Supp. 876 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (lawyer).
3 "Merchants and traders might always exhibit their books in evidence,
where it was acknowledged or proved that there had been a dealing between
the parties, or that the article had been delivered, provided they were
regularly kept with the proper distinctions of persons, things, year, month,
and day." See DALY, HIsTORicAL SKETCH OF THE JUDICmL TRBuNALS OF
NEW YORK FRoi 1623 TO 1846 (1855) 16, 1 E. D. Smith X.X; cf. Taggart
v. Fox, 11 Daly 159 (N. Y. 1882); Rexford v. Comstoc, supra note 2, at
877; 3 WIGMORE, EvENcE (1923) § 1518.
4 Vosburgh v. Thayer, supra note 1.
SPrice v. Lord Torrington, 1 Salk. 285, 2 Ld. Raym. S73 (1703); Merrill
v. Ithaca & 0. R. R., 16 Wend. 586 (N. Y. 1837).
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type of past recollection recorded when they were verified in
court by the entrant as having been correct at the time of mak-
ing. While these rules have been modified, their historical dis-
tinctions are still preserved by the courts.
Although the impelling necessity for the shopbook rule ceased
with the removal by statute of the parties' disability to testify
in their own behalf, the rule survived as an exception to the
hearsay rule.6 Functionally, there is little remaining distinction
between the two exceptions. The requirement of "no clerk"
was so limited that the employment of assistants, even book-
keepers, did not exclude the accounts if the employees were not
able to testify on behalf of the employer as to the account in
issue.7 Unfortunately, however, the courts recognize the analy-
tical similarity to the original entry rule and require that the
bookkeepers' absence be explained, or that they be made to tes-
tify as to their knowledge.8 Otherwise, the shopbook rule, hav-
ing met one archaic necessity, could be adapted to meet the
modern one of providing evidence where so many persons con-
tribute to the making of the books that it is not feasible to
have them all testify.
The rules as to business entries, as formerly restricted, would
be of very little assistance to the modern business establishment
in proving its accounts. To fill the requirements for admission
as past recollection recorded the entrant had to testify that he
personally knew at the time of making the entry that it was
correct, and not simply that he had entered the information
given him accurately, even though the person giving the infor-
mation to the bookkeeper testified that he had done so correctly.0
Later, however, the testimony that the information was entered
as given was sufficient verification if a different person could
6 Tomlinson v. Borst, 30 Barb. 42 (N. Y. 1859). Similarly, the statute
against the admission of testimony of a party to an action against the
personal representative of deceased does not change the rule as to admis-
sibility of shop books. Young v. Luce, 66 Hun. 631, 21 N. Y. Supp. 225
(2d Dept. 1892).
"The clerk intended was one who had something to do with and had
knowledge generally of the business of his employer in reference to the
goods sold or work done, so that he could testify on that subject. It evi-
dently means an employee whose duty it is to attend to the details of busi-
ness and thus is able to prove an account and not one who from his isolated
position as a book-keeper, can have but little means of knowledge person-
ally as to the transactions done, or information relating thereto, except
what is derived from others." McGoldrick v. Traphagen, 88 N. Y. 334,
838 (1882); Atwood v. Barney, 80 Hun 1, 29 N. Y. Supp. 810 (4th Dept
1894); Smith v. Smith, 163 N. Y. 168, 57 N. E. 300 (1900) (wife not a
clerk when acting under direction of husband).
s Shmargon v. Rosenstein' supra note 1.
Gould v. Conway, 59 Barb. 355 (N. Y. 1871).
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testify that the information given was true.10 Such substantia-
tion by the entrant can be dispensed with only if the evidence
is within the "entries in the regular course of business" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. This originally required that the en-
trant be dead,:" but the interpretation of unavailability has been
so broadened that absence from the jurisdiction,'- at least, al-
lows the introduction of the books without the testimony of the
entrant. It is still uncertain how much further the New York
courts are ready to modify the requirements of personal knowl-
edge or unavailability to meet the needs of the complex business
organization.
In Litchfield Construction Co. v. New York City, 3 the New
York Court of Appeals held that time-books were admissible to
prove payments for labor where the timekeeper could merely
testify that the workers on the night shifts went to work, but
could not testify as to the hours of work done. The decision
expressly stated that this was no extension of the rule because
a minor mistake in the exact number of hours would be imma-
terial in this case. They intimated that they might consider
whether the principles and practical standards which had led
to past relaxations of the antiquated rule might not lead to a
broader statement of the field where relaxation is permissible.,,
A later Appellate Division case, N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v.
Baldwin Univ. Consol. Co.,'5 refused to relax the rule. It held
that reports made up daily from time cards filled out by the
workers and checked by the foremen were inadmissible when not
testified to as correct by some person with knowledge of their
truth. The court pointed out that, on the facts, the reports
would not be admissible under The Spicm.. In that case the
federal court set forth the more liberal view as to admissibility,
but held, on a fact situation practically the same as that of the
New York case, that the accounts were erroneously admitted.
Since these New York decisions, the Federal Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has interpreted the New York rule as consis-
tent with a very liberal admission of original entries, pointing
to the Litchfleld 7 case as intimating this. This court held, in
1o City of New York v. Second Ave. R. R., 102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. E. 905
(1886).
" Merrill v. Ithaca & 0. R. R., supra note 5; Brewster v. Doane, 2 Hill
537 (N. Y. 1842).
12 State Bank of Pike v. Brown, 96 App. Div. 441, 89 N. Y. Supp. 381
(4th Dept. 1904), aff'd 184 N. Y. 517, 76 N. E. 1109 (190G).
"3244 N. Y. 251, 155 N. E. 116 (1926).
'4 Ibid. at 272, 155 N. E. at 122.
'1 219 App. Div. 578, 220 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Ist Dept. 1927).




Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,18 that a
tabulation of the amount of stamps used by a large concern
was properly admitted, although the two shipping clerks who
made the notation of the stamps used and the billing clerk who
entered the notations in the ledger were not called, since, in the
opinion of the trial court, the routine of entries guaranteed
their trustworthiness and the probability that the clerks could
add anything to the testimony was more than outweighed by
the impracticability of calling them. The court relied on The
Spica 19 as the basis of the liberal federal rule. Although they
expressed the opinion that the New York courts would be in
accord with their decision, they held that they were not bound
by the New York rule if it did differ.20
These cases leave the New York rule uncertain on a question
of great importance under present methods of doing business.
Other states have shown an analogous development from a
strict to a more liberal interpretation of similar rules.,1 Many
jurisdictions permit the admission of book accounts without com-
plete substantiation where the complexity of the organization
renders practically impossible the calling of all involved in the
make-up of the reports, and where the positive value of the tes-
timony would be slight if such persons were called.22 'Until this
step is taken, the position of the large organization in proving
its accounts is as difficult as that of the small shopkeeper would
have been in the early days without the shopbook rule. It seems
probable that it will only be a question of time before New
York definitely adjusts its rules to the needs of its complex in-
dustrial system.2 3
18 18 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
19 Supra note 16.
20 The court held that the CONFORMITY ACT [U. S. Comp. Stat. (1 Supp.
1923) § 1537] would permit an independent federal ruling under the "as
near as may be" phrase since to exclude the evidence "would not be con-
venient for the administration of justice." Cf. Comment (1927) 36 YALE
LAw JOURNAL 853.
21 Miller, Regular Entries, Books of Account, and the Iowa Statuteq
(1922) 7 IOWA L. BULL. 88; (1922) 20 MiCH. L. REV. 530; (1926) 24 Mica.
L. Rav. 721; (1923) 3 On. L. REV. 154; (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 305.
22 Givens v. Pierson's Adm'x, 167 Ky. 574, 181 S. W. 324 (1916); Nye-
Schneider-Fowler Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 105 Neb. 151, 179 N. W.
503 (1920); Farmers Nat. Bank of Kingsley v. Pratt, 193 Iowa 406, 186
N. W. 924 (1922) ; State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 433, 227 Pac. 49 (1924) ; State
v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 134 S. E. 599 (1926) ; State v. Wagner, 312 Mo.
124, 279 S. W. 23 (1925); Clover v. Neely, 116 OkI. 155, 243 Pac. 758
(1926); State v. Roach, 131 Atl. 606 (N. H. 1926).
23 For a discussion of the general need for a change in the rules of
proof to meet present conditions, see MORGAN AND OTHERS, THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE (1927) c. 5; Ehrich, Unnecessary Difflculties of Proof (1923)
32 YALE LAw JOURNAL 436; 3 WIGAORE, EVmENCE (1923) § 1530.
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A NEW APPROACH TO LABOR PROBLEMS
A recent decision 1 by the New York Court of Appeals is re-
plete with suggestions so novel with respect to labor law prob-
lems that a comparative study of the opinion with the language
used by other courts in similar problems should prove interest-
ing. The suit was brought to enjoin the defendant union from
picketing the plaintiff's premises, and in dissolving an injunc-
tion issued by the Appellate Division, the court discussed as
well the technique which would be proper in deciding whether a
strike by workmen is lawful.
Although adhering to the conventional method of analysis by
looking first at the object sought 2 and then at the means used
I Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 1'U0
(1927). Plaintiff opened a non-union restaurant employing only waitresscs
who denied union connections. After being employed, employment being at
will, each waitress promised that she would withdraw if she joined a union.
Plaintiff paid its waitresses $8 for full time, $5 for half time. The union
scale of wages was respectively $15, and $10. The defendant union pro-
cured as members four of the waitresses out of the fourteen to sixtcen
employed, and at a preconcerted signal called a strike. The union wait-
resses left the premises, there being one incident of disorder at this time,
and one other soon after. Thereupon picketing was begun, two union mern-
bers patrolling the sidewalk in front of the restaurant carrying placards
stating that a strike was in progress. There was no disorder in the picket-
ing. This continued until the union was enjoined from "patrolling the
sidewalk near the plaintiff's premises" and, as usual, from threats, intimi-
dation, and violence. 216 App. Div. 663, 215 N. Y. Supp. 753 (1st Dept.
1926), reversing a decree for defendants in the special term of the Su-
preme Court The Court of Appeals, per Andrews J. (Cardozo, C. J.,
Pound and Lehman J. J. concuring), in reversing the decree of the Appellate
Division, held that the promise not to join the union was not a contract
for lack of consideration, thus precluding a finding that a breach of con-
tract was being induced; that there was no such indication of future dis-
order in picketing as to warrant an injunction, and that there were no
other grounds for issuing an injunction. Crane J. dissentcd (Kellogg and
O'Brien, J. J., concurring in dissent), agreeing with the statements of law
contained in the majority opinion but differing as to the application of the
law to the facts of the case.
2 A strike to improve working conditions is everywhere recognized as
lawful. See Comment (1921) 30 YAlm LAW JOURI;AL 280, 284. A strike
to unionize a shop is generally upheld as lawful. National Protective Ass'n
v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902); Parkinson v. Building
Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908); Kemp v. Division 2941,
255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); LaFrance Co. v. Electrical Workero, 108
Ohio St. 61, 140 N. E. 899 (1923). But Massachusetts does not recognize
the legality of a strike for a closed shop. Baush Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. '0,
120 N. E. 188 (1918).
A strike to cause the discharge of a fellow employee is generally upheld.
Kemp v. Division 241, supra; National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, supra;
cf. Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 169, 233 Pac.
823, 827 (1925). But cf. DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317
(1911); Giblan v. Amalgamated Union [1903] 2 K. B. 600; Comment (1921)
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to accomplish the purpose, 3 its analysis iq carried on in the light
of premises seldom found in the decisions on labor problems.
The court says: "Another's business... may be attacked only
to attain some purpose in the eye of the law thought sufficient to
justify the harm that may be done to oihers," 4 and that "even
if the end sought is lawful, the means used must be also." 1 But
the question of justification is taken up in the much broader
sense of economic justification between two social groups, rather
than legal justification between individuals. The court faces
and accepts the facts of modern industrifl1 organization, and em-
phasizes the point that no valid analysiS of the elements of the
judicial problem can be made without 1recognizing the modern
fact of labor combination.6 Recognizing this, the court seeks for
30 YALE LAW JoURNAL 280, 284-5; SAYRE, CAES ON LABOR LAW (1923)
311n.
3 In a few states picketing is held to be unlawful per se as necessarily in-
volving intimidation. Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324
(1909); Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189'Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914);
Comment (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL 404, 405. In most states, how-
ever, peaceable picketing is legal, either by statute or decision. Wis. Laws
1923, c. 55; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 22, § 58; Mass. Gen. Laws
(1921) c. 149, § 24. And see SAYRE, op. cit. su ra note 2, at 199 n. But on
proof of very little disturbance the courts will enjoin picketing at the scene
of the strike. Cooks' Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. W. 1086 (Tex. 1921);
Jones v. Van Winkle Machine Works, 131 Ga1. 336, 62 S. E. 236 (1908);
Densten Hair Co. v. United Leather Workerp, 237 Mass. 199, 129 N. E.
450 (1921); Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOuRNAL 557; cf. (1926) 99
CENT. L. JouR. 383; (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 215; Comment (1927)
12 CoRN. L. Q. 226. Where, however, the v;qlence and intimidation com-
plained of takes place away from the picket line, the courts tend to be
more lenient. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, 315 Ill. 40, 145 N. E. 657
(1924).
'Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, -supra note 1, at 263, 157 N.
E. at 132.
5 Ibid. 263, 157 N. E. at 133.
6 Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44
N. E. 1077, 1081 (1896): "It is plain ... from the most superficial reading
of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that
the organization of the world.. . means an ever increasing might and scope
of combination. It seems . . . futile to set our faces against this ten-
dency. Whether beneficial on the whole ... or detrimental, it is inevitable,
unless the fundamental axioms of society and even the fundamental con-
ditions of life, are to be changed." See Hoxm, TRADE UNIONISM IN TIE.
UNITui STATES (1919) 232, in criticism of decisions having a contrary ten-
dency to that of the instant case: "Thus, thie law, built upon an individu-
alistic basis, refuses to recognize that one group of workers in a union is
vitally interested in the conditions of another group." But compare the
foregoing attitude with the following in Schwartz & Jaffee v. Hillman,
115 Misc. 61, 67-8, 189 N. Y. Supp. 21, 25-i(Sup. Ct. 1921): "they (the
courts) must stand at all times as the representatives of capital, of cap-
tains of industry, devoted to the principle of individual initiative, protect
property and persons from violence and destruction, strongly opposed to
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justification by considering the conflicting interests of the vari-
ous classes concerned.
"It [the union] may be as interested in the wages of those not
members, or in the conditions under which they work, as in its
own members because of the influence of one upon the other. All
engaged in a trade are 'affected by the prevailing rate of wages.
All, by the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organi-
zation today is not based on the single shop. Unions believe
that wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained
only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory but
generally. That they may prevail it may call a strike and picket
the premises of an employer with the intent of inducing him to
employ only union laboir.... Both are based upon a lawful pur-
pose. Resulting injury is incidental and must be endured."'
It is submitted that only by this recognition of the unions as
important elements of the labor market to which an employer
has access, rather than as officious intruders into a master-serv-
ant relationship, can a satisfactory method of approach be
evolved.
Again, the court says!.
all schemes for the nationalization of industry, and yet save labor from
oppression, and conciliatory toward the removal of the workers' just griev-
ances."
7 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, s.pra note 1, at 263, 157 N.
E. at 132-3. Compare the la-nguage in Bolivian Panama Hat Co. v. Finkel-
stein, 127 Misc. 337, 215 N. -Y. Supp. 399, 400 (Sup. Ct. 1925): "If, how-
ever, there is no strike whaterer on the plaintiff's premises, if all employeas
are content and the union simply acting for purposes of its oum, it has no
right to interfere with the pldintiff's business by picketing." (Italics ours).
And see Rentner v. Sigman, 126 Misc. 781, 783, 216 N. Y. Supp. 79, 81
(Sup. Ct. 1926): "A large part of the moving and answering papers re-
lates to the industrial merits of the controversy . . . with which I have
no concern. They are matters of social, not judicial cognizance."
A typical example of the usual procedure of considering the struggle
between employer and empl6yees as between isolated parties to a dispute
is Mechanics Foundry & Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass, 504, 505-6, 128
N. E. 877, 877-8 (1920). In enjoining a strike to force reinstatement of
an employee whom the strikers thought wrongfully discharged, the court
said:
"Every person has the legal right to dispose of his own labor as he
wishes .... The employer also has a right freely to contract, the right to
select his employees, and to decide when to engage and discharge them ....
If for any reason the employer sees fit to discharge an employee, he has
that right and it cannot be taken away from him .....
"While the individual employee may refuse for any cause to continue in
the plaintiff's service, the defendants could not conspire and combine to quit
... the plaintiff had a right, in law to do what he did, and the combina-
tion ... to bring about a strike for the cause alleged is unlawful in the
end it sought.. . !' i
It should be noted, however, that many states, unlike MIassachusett,
would consider justifiable a strike for such a purpose. See -upra note 2.
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"Freedom to condtuct a business, freedom to engage in labor,
each is like a property right. Threatened and unjustified inter-
ference with either will be prevented." 8
Although it is usual for courts to hold that an employer's ex-
pectancy to a free flow of labor is a "property right," 11 a similar
attitude towards the laborers' privilege freely to dispose of their
labor is less common.
The results of such an attitude would seem to be that, in the
future, when a court must decide upon the legality of particular
conduct on the part of either employers or workmen in a given
dispute, its technique will consist, not of an attempt to weigh
metaphysical legal relations, the existence of which has been as-
sumed, but rather to consider as dispassionately as may be the
conflicting interests of all groups involved.10
In this connection it is interesting to note what was said no
longer than twelve years ago by three members of the court of
another leading industrial state.
"The right of a labor organization to enforce a closed shop
for the mere purpose of strengthening the labor organization in
future contests with the employer is not competition, and is not
of the same character or equal to the right of the individual to
dispose of his labor at his own will." 11
Another striking observation made in the principal case may
be construed as a prophecy that the Court of Appeals will not
8 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, supra note 1, at 265, 157
N. E. at 133.
9 Courts have usually called the interest an employer has in a contract of
employment a "property right." Statutes, enacted for the purpose of pre-
venting the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, and providing that
the right to labor and make contracts shall not be considered a property
right for the purpose of enjoining interference with it in the absence of
irreparable injury, have been held unconstitutional. Bogni v. Perotti, 224
Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916) ; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E.
1007 (1900). And see Mathews v. People, 202 Ill. 389, 401, 67 N. E. 28, 32-3
(1903): "It is now well settled that the privilege of contracting is . . .
a property right. . . . Labor is property. To deprive the laborer and the
employer of this right to contract with one another is to violate . .. the
conslitution of Illinois, which provides that 'no person shall be deprived of
. . . property without due process of law'." Cf. Jersey City Printing Co.
v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 767, 53 Atl. 230, 234 (1902), in referring to
.the "probable expectancies" of employers with respect to a free flow of
labor, and those of employees with respect to free access to employment op-
portunities: "The rights of both classes are absolutely equal in respect of all
these 'probable expectancies'."
10Compare Gottlieb v. Matckin, 117 Misc. 128, 191 N. Y. Supp. 777
(Sup. Ct. 1921), where a strike tying up the milk supply of New York
City was enjoined on the ground that public health was paramount to the
interests of either party. See (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 323, 327-8.
11 Cartwright, J., Dunn, C. J., Hand, J., dissenting in Kemp v. Division
241, supra note 2, at 266-7, 99 N. E. at 409. This seems also to be the atti-
252
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consider itself bound to follow the Hitclhawau Coal Coapaay
case. 12  The Court makes clear that it will continue to deal with
this labor problem with the same approach of unprejudiced anal-
ysis of the facts of the particular case. The Court said:
"Even had it been a valid subsisting contract, however, it
should be noticed that, whatever rule we may finally adopt,
there is as yet no precedent in this court for the conclusion that
a union may not persuade its members or others to end contracts
of employment where the final intent lying behind the attempt
is to extend its influence." is
Consistency with the statement that the privilege to conduct
a business, as well as that of laboring is "like a property right,"
the importance of economic justification and the acceptance of
modern collective bargaining, will demand a careful study of the
facts in each case before deciding that inducing a breach of
contract shall be enjoined. The term of the contract, and the
purpose of the employer and of the inducer will also be impor-
tant factors. The case will not be decided by calling the act one
of "inducing breach of contract," which in most jurisdictions
would automatically mean an injunction.
tude of some courts to-day. Perhaps this view is traceable to the require-
ment of "competition" as a basis of justification for a strike. Justice
Holmes long ago, in Vegelahn v. Gunther, supra note 0, pointed out that
whether this be called true competition, or as he suggested, "free struggle
for life," the same consideration should apply in determining the enistance
of a justification as in a case of competition in the narrow sense of the
word.
2 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 3 Sup. Ct. 05
(1917) holding that contracts terminable at will were to be protected
against those inducing their breach.
'3 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, supra note 1, at 200-7, 157
N. E. at 134. As a rule, inducing the breach of a contract for special serv-
ices, or for a definite term, is enjoined. Vail-Ballou Press v. Casey, 125
Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1925); see A. L. Reed Co. v.
Whiteman, 238 N. Y. 545, 546, 144 N. E. 885 (1924); Comment (1927) 12
CORN. L. Q. 226; (1924) 33 YALE LA W JOURNAL 440; Comment (1921) ' 0
YALE LA W JOURNAL 618; cf. Brimelow v. Casson [19241 1 Ch. Div. Q 02;
Comment (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL 17L
As to contracts terminable at will, or on a few days' notice, there is a
difference of opinion. The following cases hold that inducing a breach will
be enjoined. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, mipra note 10; Patter-
son Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 Pac. 190 (1919) (termina-
ble with seven days' notice); McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga.
776, 108 S. E. 226 (1921) (contracts terminable when employees joined the
union) ; Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 149 Ga. 119, 99 S. E. 300 (1919)
(same). Contra: La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, supra note 2, hold-
ing that contracts terminable on two days' notice were at will, as tw,.o days
did not set term, and refusing to enjoin inducing breach of such contracts.
Allen, J., said at 93-4, 140 N. E. at 908: "It is difficult upon principle to see
how persuading a man to do a thing, which he may do with perfect legality,
can be illegal."
14 See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. lEv. 663,
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The notion that labor activities are neither inherently nor
prima facie "lawful" or "unlawful," is a very promising depart-
ure in method by the court in the instant case.
"Picketing without a strike is no more unlawful than a strike
without picketing." 25
This is the first expression of the Court of Appeals on a ques-
tion on which there has been great confusion among the lower
New York Courts. 16  Z
The "nature of the judicial process" in this case is indicative
of the adoption of a new technique by the highest court of a lead-
ing industrial state.17 It is submitted that further conscious de-
velopment along this line, and a discarding of the stereotypes
used for so long, will tend toward a more intelligent adjustment
of these problems in modern industry. i'
694-6, contrasting the social desirability of men being able to keep up their
standard of living with the desirability of freedom of contract: "to answer
this deep-lying problem, involving momentoug social consequences, by a
mere rule of thumb that the defendant induces a breach of the plaintiff's
contract, is hardly a method of determination ciiluclated to produce justice."
15 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin' supra note 1, at 263, 157
N. E. at 132.
16 See Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 557.
17 This method of approach has long been the basis of the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. See Brdndeis, J., dissenting in Bed-
ford Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' *Assn., 274 U. S. 37, 59, 47
Sup. Ct. 522, 529 (1927): "The plaintiffs are iiot weak employees opposed
by a mighty union. ... Together they ship 70 percent of all the cut stone
in the country... Their organization is affliated with the national employ-
ers' organization . . . standing alone, each of the journeymen's locals is
weak . . . it is only by combining the 5000 organized stone cutters in a
national union .. . that the individual stonecutter anywhere can protect his
own job."
